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IN THE SUPREr.1E COURT OF Tiii-: STATE OF llTAtl 
GEORGE 1\EV IN YOST, a Mi nor, 
by and through his Guardian 
Ad Li tern, CHARLENE YOST, and 
CHARLENE YOST, individually, 
v. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
STATE OF UTAH, STEVE HAMMON, 
CARLO SACCO, d/b/a SACCO'S 
PRODUCE, QUICK STOP, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, and 
CHRIS L. PETERSEN, 
d/b/a CHRIS'S, 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants and ) 
Appellants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
Case No. 16990 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CHRIS L. PETERSON 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff seeking to 
recover damages from the State of Utah, Carlos Sacco, d/b/a 
Sacco's Produce, Quick Stop, Inc., and Chris L. Petersen, 
for the alleged sale of alcoholic beverages to. plaintiff, 
who was a minor at the time of the accident of the age of 
16 years, alleging as the basis of its cause of action, the 
negligence of these defendants for the sale of alcoholic 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
beverage to the plaintiff, and an action against the defen-
dant, Steve Hammon, based upon the fact that he was an adult 
over the age of eighteen (18) at the time of the accident, 
and was the driver and owner of the motor vehicle wherein 
Steve Hammon was the host driver, and the plaintiff, George 
Kevin Yost, was the guest passenger. 
DISPOSTION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court al 1 owed and granted a Mot ion for Summary 
Judgment to Carlo Sacco, d/b/a Sacco's Produce, even though 
they had sold alcoholic beverages to the respondent, Yost. 
The Court further granted Judgment as against the defendant, 
Steve Hammon, the State of Utah, and Chris L. Petersen, 
finding five percent (5%) negligence on the part of the 
State of Utah, five percent (5%) negligence on the part of 
Yost, and thereby providing that Yost could not obtain 
judgment against the State of Utah; finding eighty percent 
(80%) comparative negligence as against the driver and 
adult, Steve Hammon, and finding ten percent (10%) negl i-
gence as to the defendant, Chris L. Petersen. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Lower Court's Order and 
Judgr.ient as to the percent of 1iabi1 i ty attributed to the 
appellant Chris L. Petersen, and the percent attributable to 
2 
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t he P 1 a i n t i f f . a s we l l a s t he o t he r de f e n d :i n t s i n t h i s 
action, and for reversal of the ~.lotions for Summary J\1.! 1 ~:wnt 
a s ag a i n s t the co - de fend an t , Sacco ' s , and f o r t he d i sm i s s : ti 
in total, as to any liability of Chris L. Petersen, upon the 
grounds as stated as a defense in the Answer of the plain-
tiff, and as affirmed in the Affidavit attached thRt the 
said defendant and appellant is not the principal party in 
interest in this action before the Court, and upon the 
further grounds that the lower court has failed to properly 
interpret and apply the Utah Comparative Negligence Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only appellant in this action before the Court is 
the defendant Chris L. Petersen, who while alleged to be the 
owner of premises operated as "Chris's" made an affirmative 
denial of any liability or connection with the action before 
the Court, and no evidence of any kind throughout the entire 
litigation, and nowhere in the record before the Court is 
there any evidence or proof that the appe 11 ant, Chris L. 
Petersen, against whom judgment has been rendered, is in 
fact the owner or operator of the premises wherein the 
plaintiff is alleged to have purchases alcoholic beverages. 
There is an Affidavit attached to this Brief in affirmation 
thereof. 
3 
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Throughout the Brief, the appellant Chris L. Petersen, 
will be referred to as "Appellant", while the other 
co-defendants wil 1 be referred to as "Hammon", "Sacco", 
"Quick Stop", and "State of Utah". 
The Respondent (Yost) was sixteen (16) years old on the 
d a t e o f the a cc i dent , wh i ch occurred on Au gu s t 3 1 , 19 7 6 
(R 106) . Hammon, who was the driver of the 1972 Ford three 
quarter ton truck involved in the accident, and wherein Yost 
was a passenger, was over eighteen (18) years of age as of 
the date of the accident, and one Ronald K. Sills, was 
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the accident, and 
is not a party to this action, but was a passenger in the 
motor vehicle driven by Hammon and wherein Yost was also a 
passenger at the time of the accident (Dep. at p. 7, R 106). 
On the date of the accident, Hammon drove to the public 
school grounds wherein Yost and Sills made arrangements with 
Hammon to skip school and to buy alcoholic beverages and 
drive to Ogden Canyon and into the ski resort areas thereof. 
(R 107) The three (3) young adults left the school grounds 
at 12:30 p.m., all three planning a drunken spree and drove 
to Sacco's in Roy, Utah, and Hammon, together with Yost and 
Sills, went inside the premises where Hammon purchased 2 six 
packs of beer without being required to show any 
identification as to the age of the purchaser, Hammon. 
4 
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Yo s t , S i 1 l s and Hammon each d r . 1 n k two ( 2) c n n s o f b ·~ " r w l d 1 1 • 
enrouta to the State Liquor Store at Clearfield, llt11h. 
( T2 4 4) 
Hammon drove his truck into the rear parking lot of the 
Clearfield State Liquor Store and was able to purchase five 
(5) one-fifth bottles of wine, without being required to 
furnish any ID, and after purchasing the wine, exited 
through the rear of the store. (Dep. at pp. 13 & 14). 
The three (3) young adults then went to the drive-in 
window of Quick Stop, and purchased two (2) six-packs of 
Coors, at the drive-in window. (T 166). 
Hammon acquired two (2) six-packs of beer from Sacco's 
(T 169); two (2) six-packs of beer from Quick Stop; and five 
(5) one-fifth bottles of wine from the Clearfield Liquor 
Store (T 166-168). 
They then began their trip to Powder Mountain in Ogden 
Canyon via the North Ogden Divide. All three (3) of the wit-
nesses, Hammon, Yost and Sills, in their testimony, agreed 
that all five fifths of the wine and a substantial amount of 
the beer had been consumed by the time they had driven over 
the North Ogden Divide, (R 108), and as they continued to 
drive up to Pine View Dam and into the vicinity of Snow 
Basin, they continued to drink the remainder of their beer 
and indulged in taking off their clothes and frolicking 
(R 108) . 
5 
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The driver Hammon, together with Yost and Si 11 s, then 
left the Snow Basin area, and drove allegedly to a place of 
business known as Chris's and purchased a six-pack of beer 
(Dep. at pp. 20, 22 and 61), and Hammon further stated that 
each of the three (3) drank only a single can of beer, of 
the beer purchased from Chris's (T 344). 
The accident causing the injury to Yost,Hammon and 
Sills occurred as the truck driven by Hammon descended from 
the Powder Mountain Resort. (Dep. at p 23) Hammon testi-
fying that it was a steep grade downhill and that he was 
driving about 25 to 30 miles an hour and had shifted down to 
a lowe:...· gear so as to require less use of the brakes and 
that the truck got too close to the edge of the road causing 
the truck to roll over. (Dep. at pp. 23, 24) 
Carol Petersen (who was and is the owner and operator 
of Chris's (See Affidavit attached) testified that her 
primary occupation was an RN at St. Benedicts Hospital in 
the capacity of continuing Educational Co-ordinator, and 
that she had been a registered nurse for twenty-five (25) 
years, and held a Bachelor's Degree from the Dee Hospital, 
and was doing Post-Graduate work in Behavioral Sciences, and 
had been for seven teen ( 1 7) years engaged in the operation 
of Chris's, and that on the date of the accident, she was in 
fact operating the premises specifically during the times at 
6 
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which the three (3) young ndults testified th;tl they hud 
p u r c ha s e d bee r a t Ch r i s ' s . ( T 3 4 7 , 3 ·I 8) Sh c f u r t h , · r s t a t c d 
that she had never seen the plaintiff, nor Hammon, nc1r Sills 
in the place of business, and that she would nt~V•'r have sold 
beer to any one of the three persons. (T :HS). 
r.1rs. Petersen further testified that there is another 
business nearby that had a drive-in window. and sold beer: 
and that the premises which she operated did not carry Har.lP.ls 
beer, as was testified to by the witnesses. (T 355) . 
The testimony of Hammon was to the effect that he hnd 
never be fore purchased any beer at Chris's (T 39) , and the 
same testimony was elicited fro1a from Sill. (Dep. at p.39. 
T 200) 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT, CHRIS L. PETERSEN, WAS NOT A 
PRINCIPAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 
In answer to the Complaint of the plaintiff and 
respondent, the appellant, Chris L. Petersen, filed an 
affirmative defense that he was not a principal party in 
interest, alleging thereby that he was not the owner nor 
operator of the premises known as Chris's. (See Affidavit 
attached) 
7 
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The appellant did not appear as a witness for any of 
the parties to this cause of action, and no evidence of any 
kind was introduced, evidencing the appellant to be an 
employee, owner, or operator of the business premises, and 
the appellant further stated as an affirmative defense that 
the Complaint of the plaintiff did not state a cause of 
action as against said appellant. 
The respondent alleged in its Complaint that Chris L. 
Petersen was an owner of the premises known as Chris's, but 
during the course of the trial offered no evidence whatso-
ever as to the ownership of the premises, nor did the 
respondent subpoena the appellant as a witness, take depo-
sitions, ask interrogatories, ·or do anything in an affir-
mative manner to evidence in any way whatsoever, that the 
appellant, Chris L. Petersen, was the owner, operator, or in 
any way connected with the business known as Chris's, even 
though the appellant made an affirmative defense and denial 
that said appellant was the owner or operator of the 
premises, or a party in interest in the matt er before the 
Court. 
In £!~~! ~~!!£~~! ~~~~ v. Ford, 216 P.691, the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming stated: 
The burden of proof is upon the party 
asserting the affirmative of an issue, 
using the latter term in the larger 
sense and as including any negative 
proposition which such party might have 
to show. If he alleges a fact that is 
8 
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den i ed , he mus t e s t • 1 b 1 i sh i t . He i s t. he 
actor, and as such, remains so thro1q~h­
out the case as to the a 11 erra t ions which 
he makes, or rather must ~'ake. ll:1ving 
alleged the truth of a matter in issue. 
he must prove it. The party denying his 
al 1 ega t ion cannot have this burden at 
any time during the trial, for it would 
be absurd to say that both the plaintiff 
and defendant have the same burden on 
the same issue .... In other words, the 
burden of maintaining the affirmative of 
the issue involved in the action is upon 
the party alleging the fact which con-
stitutes the issue, and this burden 
remains throughout the trial. If upon 
all the facts the case is left in 
equipoise, the party affirming must 
fa i 1. 
Additional authorities on this issue is ~!IT~~~£ On 
Evidence 2d ed. §§ 2483-2490; On Evidence, 
-------
§ 940; Evidence, § 370; Scott v. wood, 81 
--------
Ca 1. 3 9 8 , 2 2 P • 8 7 1 ; ~~~~~~~ v . ~!!.!_~~ , 2 2 8 U • S • 2 3 3 , 3 3 
S. Ct. Rp tr. 416. 
Wyoming Supreme Court further stated in the First 
~~!!~~~! ~an~, ~~EE~= 
He who·has the burden of proof, properly 
speaking, has imposed on him the obliga-
tion to establish the existence of the 
facts alleged by evidence, and leave 
s u f f i c i en t to de s t r oy the e q u i 1 i b r i um 
and overbalance any weight of evidence 
produced by the other party. 
Gu i 1 d v • r.fo ore , 3 2 N . D a k . 4 3 2 , 15 5 N . W • 4 4 ; 6 7 Wa sh . 2 1 0 , 
121 P.452. 
9 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF 
THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF ALL OF THE 
PARTIES WHO WERE TORTFEASORS. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in ~~~i~ ~~es !~ ~lb~ttson~s~ 
Inc:, 587 P.2d l,30 (Nov. 2, 1978), had before it the issue 
as to whether or not a surrnnary judgment was justified when 
there was a sale of beer by one party, and other alcoholic 
beverages by a second party, in determining whether or not 
one of the parties was negligent in the sale of an alcoholic 
beverage sold by one, was a proximate cause as against the 
sale of alcohol by the other party constituting the proxi-
mate cause of the intoxication and injury ~o the plaintiff, 
both parties having presented expert witnesses wherein one 
party al 1 eged that there is no evidence to show a casual 
relationship as between the plaintiff's alleged purchase of 
beer from the defendant, and the plaintiff's intoxication as 
against the other alcohol which was consummed by the plain-
ti ff by reason of mixing of the defendant's alcohol with 
that of another seller of alcoholic beverages. The Court in 
reply to the position statements of the experts and the 
allegations made by the appellant and the defendant stated: 
That even if it cannot be determined 
exactly how much of the defendant's beer 
contributed to his intoxication from the 
brand names on empty cans in plaintiff's 
car, it could reasonably be believed 
that a substantial portion thereof com-
bined with other liquors to cause plain-
tiff's intoxication, and that defendant 
10 
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cou 1 d therefore be deemed to have con-
tributed in causing the accident. .. 
Upon this basis it is urged that not-
withstanding whatever his own negl i;~cnce 
and responsibility may be, under our 
statute which now permits contribution 
by joint tort-feasors, the plaintiff is 
entitled to have a determination made as 
to his claim of defendant's negligence 
and responsibility. 
The Court further stated: 
What is necessary to meet the test of 
negligence and proximate cause, is that 
it be reasonably foreseeable, not that 
the particular accident would occur, but 
only that there is a likelihood of an 
occurence of the same general nature. 
In that contention, it is to be had in 
mind that the j u ry i s en t i t 1 ed t o base 
its judgment, not only upon the facts 
shown, but to indulge such reasonable 
inferences as may be fairly drawn 
therefrom. Considered in that light, we 
think reasonable minds could believe 
that in selling beer to a minor, such as 
plaintiff, the defendant should reason-
ably have foreseen the 1 ikel ihood of it 
being combined with an automobile and 
result in some occurrence such as even-
tuated here. 
In the instant matter before the Court, the trier of 
facts assessed five percent (5%) of comparative negligence 
to the State of Utah, by reason of its liquor store selling 
five (5) one-fifths of wine to Hammon, notwithstanding the 
fact that the purchaser parked in the parking lot of the 
liquor store, and entered through its parking lot door from 
the rear, and existed the same way, after having purchased 
11 
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the five (5) one-fifths of wine, without the furnishings of 
an ID. The Court found that the State Liquor Store sold 
five ( 5) bottles of wine to Hammon, even though Hammon' s 
appearance would have put anyone on not ice who was reason-
ably observant that he was eighteen (18) years old, and was 
not in fact twenty-one (21) years of age; found that the 
boys left the State Liquor Store in the truck after the pur-
chase of the wine; found that the boys did drink al 1 five 
(5) one-fifths of the wine. (R 137) 
-It is noted that the Court found only five percent (5%) 
of comparative negligence for the State Liquor Store having 
sold such large quantity of alcohol to a person under the 
age of twenty-one (21) and who obviously had, according to 
the Court, an appearance of being not of the age of 
twenty-one (21), was negligent only in an amount of five 
percent (5%). 
Comparing the five percent (5%) negligence of the State 
Liquor Store for its sale of five fifths of alcohol to the 
minor, as against the purchase and sale of a single six-pack 
of beer, as was testified to by Hammon in his deposition, 
which was taken on November, 1977, for an accident which had 
o c curred on Au gu s t 3 1 , 1 9 7 6 . ( De p . , a t pp . 2 0 , 2 2 and 6 1) . 
The Court made the finding that Chris L. Petersen had 
negligent 1iabi1 i ty of ten percent (10%) or twice the amount 
of negligence of that of the State Liquor Store. 
12 
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The Court made a finding in justification of the 1:1q~cr 
percent as against Petersen, by stating in its '.l1·1:11irnndur.i 
Decision, that the act of Petersen selling- the beer to 
Harrunon was an act of gross negligence, evidencing a tot:il 
disregard for the consequences, based upon the allegation 
that because of the location of the premises of Chris's that 
anyone who sold beer to Hammon, would know that he was in a 
vehicle and driving, and in a drunken condition at the time 
the alcohol was sold to Hammon. (R 140-141) 
The Court made a finding in its arriving at a 
conclusion of gross negligence by alleging: 
There is a campground in the areu, but 
both the campground and this tavern are 
wel 1 known landmarks in Weber County, 
and they are separated by some distance. 
The Cou r t a 1 so no t i c e d that th i s was 
after school had started in the late 
summertime or early fall. The Court 
believes that with any decree of obser-
vation at all, anyone who sold the beer 
to them would know they were in a 
vehicle and driving. (R 140) 
The testimony of the only witnesses who were cal led 
upon to give information as to the premises of Chris's, 
testified that they had never purchased beer there before, 
and did not testify that the tavern was a well-known land-
mark in Weber County.· (R 140) 
If the Court could take judicial notice that Chris's is 
a well-known landmark, and that people arrive there by motor 
vehicle, they could also take judicial notice that the 
13 
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Clearfield State Liquor Store has a large parking area, is 
not in a heavy urbanized area, and that it does not rely 
upon foot traffic or the immediate neighbors in the com-
mercial downtown area of Clearfield, for the purchase of its 
alcoholic beverages, but relies practically totally upon 
motor vehicle traffic, and that the same allegation that 
school had started, that it was in the late summertime or 
early fall, or that anyone with any decree of observation 
would know that buyer was in a vehicle and driving, would 
also pertain to the State Liquor Store. 
The only actual testimony as· to the location of the 
defendant, Petersen's, business in relation to the traffic 
and surroundings, was given at time of trial by Mrs. 
Petersen, as set forth in the following dialogue on 
examination: 
Q. Let me ask you, are there other people 
or other establishments in the area 
close to Chris's that are similarly 
situated and that also sell beer. 
A. There is one business that 
station, a drive-in window, 
sells beer. 
has a gas 
and al so 
Q. OK, now in connect ion with your busi-
ness, are there also people that live in 
t he i mme d i a t e are a th a t come in that 
live there on a regular basis, buy pur-
chases and leave? 
A. There is a campground, Anderson's Cove, 
down the road a ways, and there are 
trailer in behind the place. 
14 
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Q. How ~any trailers are there behind? 
A. I think six or eight. 
Q. OK, are there also people that come in 
and camp there for hunting, fishing, 
this type of thing? 
A. That is mostly the type of people we 
get. 
Q. That is mostly the type you get? 
A. Yeah, Yes. They can walk over from the 
camp up to our place. 
Q. OK. 
A. When they're on boats. 
(T 3 49) 
The Lower Court, in its determination of the compar-
ative negligence of all of the parties who are tort-feasors 
and contributed to the sale of alcohol to the plaintiff, 
Hammon, as the driver, and to Sill, as the other passenger, 
did not take into consideration any comparative negligence 
whatsoever of the two commercial establishments, who sold 
beer to them even though Hammon testified that he purchased 
beer at Sacco's, (D 9) which is an isolated service store, 
existing for the purpose of serving motor vehicle traffic 
customers. The testimony of Ronald Sill as a passenger, was 
that there were two ( 2) six-packs of beer of 12-oz. cans 
purchased from Sacco's. (T 169) It was further testified by 
the witnesses, that the three (3) youths drove up to the the 
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motor service vehicle 1 window of Quick Stop and purchased two 
( 2) six-packs of Coors beer. (T 166) 
There was no expert testimony whatsoever as to the 
effect of the consumption of alcohol purchased from any of 
the sellers, or the effect on the driver, or the other 
parties who were passengers of the driver. 
The Court, in its granting of its Summary Judgment to 
Sacco's, stated in its holding: 
(R 9 3) 
The Court believes and so holds that in 
addition to the showing of the sale and 
contravention of law, the evidence must 
go beyond to show that the circumstances 
under which a sale were made, were such 
that the defendant knew, or under the 
circumstances should have knonn, the 
alcohol sale might subject other persons 
to an unreasonable or unacceptable risk 
of injuries. 
The Court therefore al lowed a Summary Judgment and a 
dismissal of Sacco's from the suit, without waiting to con-
sider any assessment of comparative negligence as to that 
defendant, based upon the fact that even though the parties 
drove up to the premises of a store that catered to the 
driving public, and purchased two (2) six-packs of beer, and 
all three (3) of the young persons, including the driver and 
his two passengers, went inside the store at Sacco's to make 
the purchase of the six packs of beer together. (T 186) 
That there could be no distinct ion as be tween the sale of 
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12-oz. cans of beer to the three (3) minors ;1s not being 
under such circumstances, where the defendant knew or should 
have known under the circumstances that the sale might sub-
ject other persons to an unreasonable or unacceptable risk 
of injuries, while finding in its holding as against Chris's 
that the sale of one (1) pack of beer to Hammon, only, was 
of such circumstances as would justify a ten percent (10%) 
comparative negligence to Chris's and a zero percent (0%) of 
negligence to Sacco's. 
The Court's further finding, in its l\1emorandum Deci-
sion, that a basis of assessing ten percent (10%) negligence 
as to Chris's was "that these boys were al 1 three extremely 
intoxicated, and under age". (R 140) While the most com-
petent evidence shows that the alcoholic blood test at the 
hospital which occurred between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., was 
.10%, as to Hammon, with the purchase having been made at 
Chris's between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m. (T 279), and in accor-
dance with the testimony of Dr. Alvin Cobabe, who is the 
manager of Powder Mountain and a doctor, (T 209, 210) the 
accident occurred at 3:30 p.m. (T 228) 
The plaintiff and respondent Yost, testified that two 
( 2) six-packs of beer were purchased at Qui ck Stop (T 241) 
which was drank immediately, after which they drove to the 
Clearfield State Liquor Store~ parked in the parking lot and 
Hammon entered the premises through the back door, and came 
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back out through the back· door with five (5) one-fifths of 
wine, and that they started drinking the wine immediately. 
(T 242, 243) 
Yost further testified that he drank the same quantity 
as Hammon and Sill, and that they consummed one and one-half 
(1 1/2) or two ( 2) six-packs of the beer purchased from 
Quick Stop, prior to the purchase of the wine at the Clear-
field State Liquor Store, then drove to Sacco's and all 
three (3) went in and purchased two (2) six-packs of Hamms 
beer. (T 244, 245) 
Yost further testified that he drank one and one-half 
(1 1/2) bottles of the wine, while driving over the divide, 
prior to reaching Snow Basin, and that the wine and beer was 
kept in the back of the truck in a box with ice in it 
(T 267) and that the plaintiff, Yost, climbed into the back 
of the truck while the truck was moving, each time that it 
was necessary to replenish the supply of wine or beer in the 
cab. (T 248) 
It was further testified at the time of purchasing from 
Chris's, that Yost himself had consummed nine (9) beers and 
one and one-half (1 1/2) fifths of wine, and that he 
believed the driver to be intoxicated. (T 250) Yost 
further testified that he had consummed prior to the 
accident, twelve (12) cans of beer, plus part of another 
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six-pack, in addition to the one and one-half (1 1/2) 
bottles of wine. (T 294) 
0 n d i rec t ex am i n a t i on , Yo s t t e s t i f i e d t h n t he w; 1 s 
riding in the back of the truck, when the truck left Powder 
~1ountain, and the fol lowing dialogue was recorded as to the 
conduct of Yost: 
Q. So you went outside 
perimet.er of the car, 
the door? 
of the inner 
or did you open 
A. No. I crawled right through the window. 
Q. Is that the 
going back 
all day? 
A. Yeah. 
window that you had been 
and forth to get your beer 
Q. You mean as the car was moving, you were 
going out the passenger side of the car, 
going in the back of the truck, getting 
the beer, handing it out, then climbing 
in that way again? 
A. Quite a few times. 
(T 285) 
Dr. Cobade, manager of the Powder Mountain Ski Resort, 
and a medical doctor (T 210), testified to the following 
dialogue: 
Q. When is the first time you became aware 
of the presence of the young men that 
were involved in the accident. 
A. I was sitting in ~y office, and I heard 
a noise out in the parking lot, and I 
went to the window to see what was 
happening. And a car was just leaving 
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Q. 
the parking lot a quite a high rate of 
speed and nearly ran off the road when 
they 1 e ft. 
OK, you say a car. 
truck? 
Was it a pickup 
A. It was a pickup truck. 
Q. Did you see the peop 1 e 
involved in that truck? 
that were 
A. I. .. as I recall, there was one or 
possibly two people standing in the back 
end of· it. I am sure there was one, 
because I noticed he had only his 
shorts. 
(T 211) 
The testimony of Dr. Cobade, together with the test i-
mony of Yost, that Yost was in the back of the truck and 
standing up therein at the time that the truck exited from 
Powder rifountain, and which was just prior to the accident, 
which occurred within one or onehalf mile after leaving the 
parking area on Powder Mountain (T 278), is evidence of a 
total reckless and negligent conduct of a young man of six-
teen ( 16) years of age. The Court in its Memorandum 
Decision made a finding: 
A 1 1 o f the boys had some t r a in i ng in 
automobile safety, and all understood in 
the general sort of way of the dangers 
of driving and drinking, as they applied 
the quantities of alcohol consummed, 
etc. 
(R 13 8) 
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Q. Had you been drinking with Ron on 
occasion without Steve? 
A. Quite a bit. 
Q. During the year or so you had known him, 
could you give me an estimate of the 
times you went out drinking with him? 
A. Pretty close 
possible. 
( T 2 6 2) 
to every weekend, if 
In further questioning the plaintiff, Yost, he was 
asked: 
Q. Then in the course of driver's training 
and in taking your examination for your 
license, had you had any information 
given to you about the effects of drink-
ing and driving? 
A. Yeah. They gave me that little pamphlet 
like so much -- how much weight you are, 
how many beers you can drink unt i 1 you 
will be drunk or something like that. 
Q. Yeah. Did you ... 
A. I looked at those. I never read them, I 
just looked through it. 
(T 2 6 2) 
* * * 
Q. But did you object to Steve driving and 
drinking. 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, if I understand your testimony, 
you didn't pay any attention to the way 
he was driving? 
A. No. I was just having a good time. 
(T 2 6 3) 
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The Court found that the plaintiff, Yost, had only five 
percent ( 5%) negligence, in spite of al 1 of the previous 
testimony as to his driver training experience; his know-
ledge of the effect of alcohol upon the person; his know-
ledge that the driver was drunk; his previous experience at 
getting drunk; on drinking beer and wine; his climbing in an 
out of a moving truck while going through treacherous canyon 
roads to retrieve beer and wine from the back of the truck; 
his standing in the back of the truck on leaving Powder 
Mountain just prior to the accident which occurred on the 
way down from Powder Mountain; as compared to the negligence 
of Chris's found by the lower court to be ten percent (10%) 
negligence or twice the amount of that of the plaintiff by 
reason of the sale of one (1) six-pack of beer which was 
made to Hammon and not to Yost, as against the negligence of 
the State of Utah in sel 1 ing five (5) one-fifths of wine 
without requiring an ID, even though the customer entered 
and left through the motor vehicle parking area of the State 
Liquor Store, and with full knowledge that practically all 
of the customers at the State Liquor Store in Clearfield are 
drive-in customers; with eighty percent (80%) negligence to 
the driver Hammon, and no negligence as to Sacco's sale of 
two ( 2) cans of beer to a known driver, and with al 1 three 
(3) of the parties being inside the store at the time of the 
purchase; and with no neg 1 i gence assessed as against Qui ck 
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Stop, where al 1 three (3) drove up to a motor vehicle ser 
vice window and purchased beer without the requirement of an 
ID. 
The 
POINT III 
INTENT OF UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT IS 
TO EQUITABLY DETERr.1INE ONE HUNDRED PERCENT 
(100%) OF TOTAL NEGLIGENCE. 
Utah Comparative Negligence Act, § 78-27-37, 
~..!.-:_~~.9..:., UCA as amended in 1953, and amended in 197 3, is 
almost verbatim to the language of the Comparative 
Negligende Act adopted by the State of Idaho in 1971, under 
Id a ho Code § 6- 8 0 1 ( Su pp . , 19 7 3) , and the Id a ho Code i s 
directly traceable to the original Wisconsin Statutes as 
Annotated, § 895. 045 (1966). 
The Utah Act in its title states: 
An act relating to actions for the 
recovery of damages in actions based on 
negligence or gross negligence; removing 
contributory negligence as a bar to any 
recovery under certain circumstances; 
providing for the diminishing of any 
recovery in proportion to the negligence 
of the person seeking recovery; provid-
ing for separate judgments as to damages 
and proportionate negligence; providing 
for contribution among joint tort-
feasors; providing for the release of 
one or more j o int tort - f ea so rs w i thou t 
releasing them al 1; and providing for 
the effect of such releases on other 
joint tort-feasors. 
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Section 78-27-37 of the Act does not intend to provide 
for the characterization of negligence as -ordinary negli-
gence or gross negligence in the sense of contributory neg-
ligence prior decisions, and specifically states: 
But any damages allowed shall be dimin-
ished in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person 
recovering. As used in this Act, 
'contributory negligence' includes 
'assumption of the risk.' 
It is submitted that any of the parties who exhibit a 
faulty conduct must be shown to be a proximate cause of the 
injury before any comparison can be made for the purpose of 
establishing the proportion of the negligence of each of the 
parties, and that the faulty conduct of the Act, not the 
causation, is the basis of a comparison for arriving at a 
percentage of the comparative negligence of each of the 
actors. 
The Lower Court, in its attempt to make an application 
of the percent of negligence as to each of the parties, 
considered the first determination to be made by the Court 
was the percent considered only from a view of causation 
(R 142, 143); that the second matter to be arrived at would 
be to find the degree of fault of each of the parties, and 
that the final amount of negligence as to each of the par-
ties would be by a combination of fault, causation and 
application of what the Court considered an equitable 
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balance of those two considerations in fixing rl~sponsibi 1 i ty 
under Utah's Compa~ative Negligence Statute. 
I t i s f i r s t t o be no t e d th a t the Co u r t co u 1 < l no t have 
arrived at one hundred percent (100%) of the negligence 
involved in the matter before the Court, without considering 
the negligence of Sacco's and Quick Stop in their sale of 
alcohol to Yost, Hammon and Sill, and that it was the intent 
of the Statute and of the Legislature by removing the sub-
stance of risk and contributory negligence aspects, that all 
parties that contributed to the ultimate injury to the 
plaintiff would be required to be assessed by the Court, and 
that the consumption of twenty- four ( 2 4) 12-oz. cans of beer 
purchased from Sacco's and Quick Stop, and consummed by the 
three (3) young men cannot be found to have been non-
causa tive or non-faulty as to the injuries or liability of 
the parties before the Court. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was a pioneer in the law 
of comparative negligence which was established by Judicial 
decision, and is the oldest jurisdiction in experience and 
judicial decisions as to comparative negligence, and 
indirectly the jurisdiction upon which the laws of the State 
of Utah relating to comparative negligence is founded, in 
that the State of Idaho used the laws of Wisconsin as a 
basis for its statutes, and the State of Utah used the Idaho 
Statutes as a basis for the Utah Statutes. The Wisconsin 
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Suprene Court in the case of Bielski v. Schutze, 16 
Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962) stated in reference to 
the basic goal of the law of negligence as: 
The equitable distribution of the loss 
in relation to the respective contri-
butions of the faults causing it. 
It is submitted to the Court that if "faulty conduct" 
is a reasonable basis for the determination of the negli-
gence of the appellant, Chris's, it is submitted that sale 
of a six-pack of beer to Hammon by Chris's sold from inside 
the premises and not from service window (Dep. at p. 10), is 
substantially less "faulty" than that of the State Liquor 
Store in its sale of five (5) one-fifths of wine to Hammon 
without requiring an ID, and with knowledge that practically 
al 1 of its trade comes from customers who arrive in motor 
vehicles, and in the particular instance when the customer 
entered and left by the rear parking lot door. It is also 
submitted to the Court that there is a greater duty of care 
t o the S t at e of U t ah as a re t a i 1 di s pens er of in tox i cant 
liquors, much more potent than beer, and by the very mandate 
of the Legislature and the people of the State of Utah, who 
have allowed the sale of high-percentage alcoholic beverages 
by the State of Utah believing that the State is more trust-
worthy as a dispenser of such alcoholic beverages than the 
regular commercial vendor would be. 
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It is further submitted that the negl igencc of Y1>st 
considered in the light that: 
1. Yost was sixteen (16) years of age at the time of 
the occurrence of the accident; 
2. He contributed to the purchase of the alcohol; 
3. That Yost, together with Sills and Hammon planned 
the drunken spree; 
4. That he continued to ride with Hammon, knowing 
that they were all going to get drunk, and after Yost was 
aware that Hammon was drunk at the time that the motor 
vehicle was at rest a Powder Mountain, and was at rest at 
Chris's, and yet continued to ride with Hammon; 
5. That Yost crawled from the cab to the back of the 
truck to retrieve the beer and wine as it was needed to 
drink, without the motor vehicle being at rest; 
6. That Yost had had driver's training, and was aware 
of the effects of alcohol, not only upon himself, but upon 
one who is a driver of motor vehicle; 
7 . Tha t the evidence re 1 at i ng t o Yo s t , in accordance 
with the testimony as has been set forth in this Brief, 
evidenced that he had been on many previous drunken sprees, 
and was well aware of the effects of alcohol on himself and 
on Hammon and Sills; 
8. That upon leaving Powder r.1ountain, Yost was stand-
ing upright in the back of the truck, unclad with only his 
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shorts, as evidenced in the previous records set forth in 
this Brief (R 143, 144, 145). 
That notwithstanding the conduct of Yost and his faulty 
conduct, the Court found that from the causation point of 
view, Hammon had ninety percent (90%) negligence, Yost four 
percent (4%), Petersen five percent (5%), and the State of 
Utah one percent (1%). (R 143) 
The Court then found from a fault point of view, that 
Hammon has fifty percent (50%); Yost ten percent (10%); 
Petersen thirty percent (30%); and the State of Utah, only 
ten percent (10%). (R 144). 
The Court then found that by combining fault and 
causation, which the Court considered a "conscionable type 
of balance", it found the negligenc.e to be Hammon at eighty 
percent (80%) Yost at five percent (5%); Petersen at ten 
percent (10%) 
(R 146) . 
and the State of Utah at five percent (5%). 
It is submitted to the Court that the conscionable 
fol lowing of the Wisconsin Rule of Law as set forth in 
~iel~~! !~ ~ch~l~~' ~~E~~' and arriving at liability through 
the "equitable distribution of the laws, in relation to the 
respective contribution of the faults causing it", are 
grossly misapplied, as to both the faults attributable to 
the State of Utah's Clearfield Liquor Store, and as to the 
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plaintiff, Yost, by a finding that Petersen was twice as 
faulty as the State of Utah and Yost. I t is s ubm i t t • · d to 
the Court that this Court stated in Hindmarsh v. 0. P. 
~~~~~~ ~~~~!!~~~' 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (Oct., 1968): 
The doctrine of assumption of risk was 
but a specialized aspect of the defense 
of contributory negligence. This court 
has repeatedly declared the law in that 
respect; that it applies only where the 
plaintiff knew of and appreciated a 
danger, and had a reasonable opportunity 
to make an alternative choice, but 
never-the-less voluntarily exposed them-
sel f to the danger in question. 
While the Comparative Negligence Act eliminates the 
defense of contributory negligence, it was not intended that 
comparative negligence shal 1 act in the same manner as the 
Workman's Compensation Act as to the liability of the 
actors, but if any basis of conscionability and equity is to 
be used in determining faulty conduct, then surely a deter-
mination of the plaintiff's appreciation and knowledge and 
the danger in which the plaintiff, Yost, had placed himself, 
and the fact that he had, on a number of occasions, a 
reasonable opportunity to make an alternative choice and 
escape from the danger which he knew existed, both from his 
previous drinking experience, and from his driver training, 
who never-the-less continued to voluntarily expose himself 
to the danger in question, must make his contribution to the 
ultimate injury which he suffered greater than that of 
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Chris's, or at least as great as Chris's, and particularly 
so when the Lower Court in is so-called application of 
equitable principles, found that the State of Utah had only 
the same degree of negligence as that of Yost, and one-half 
of that of Chris's. 
The decision of the Court is all the more inequitable, 
in that having found that Hammon has eighty percent (80%) 
liability, the Court allowed the settlement of the total 
policy of Hammon in the amount of $15,000.00, as the total 
liability for Hammon, while assessing him with eighty per-
cent (80%) negligence, the Lower Court found and stated: 
(R 14 4) 
Hammon is, in likelihood, a judgment 
proof individual. 
The hearing before the Court was bifurcated so that 
only the percent of the comparative negligence was adjudi-
cated, and that a subsequent hearing would determine the 
money and 1iabi1 i ty, and the Court, by finding that Hammon 
had eighty percent (80%) of the negligence with Yost, and 
the State of Utah having only five percent (5%), then leaves 
Petersen at ten percent (10%), with liability for all the 
damages that may be found, and in accordance with the 
Court's own finding with no likelihood that it can obtain 
any contribution from Hammon, and is liable for ninety-five 
percent (95%) of the total liability, with the State of Utah 
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as the contributor of five percent (5%), and with Sacco and 
Quick Stop ns not having been determined to have any percent 
of liability by the finding of the Court, with Chris's left 
with the sole liability, and with the requirement of having 
to pay whatever damages are found, and then seeking its five 
percent (5%) contribution from the State of Utah; which 
factual situation renders all the more unconscionable the 
finding of the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that all of the 
record being before the Court, and the fact that the Court 
considered causation as a basis for the determination of the 
percent of negligence of the parties, together with not 
ascertaining the percent of negligence of Quick Stop and 
Saccos, together with the unconscionable finding of the 
small amount of percentage attributable to the State of Utah 
Liquor Store, makes unconscionable the percent of 
comparative negligence attributed to Chris's, and the Court 
should further consider the fact that the defendant, Chris 
Petersen, alleged as an affirmative defense, that he is not 
a principal party in interest, and the affidavit attached 
hereto evidences that he is not the party in interest, and 
that no finding should be made as against the defendant, 
Chris Petersen. 
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RESPECTFULLY Sm.1MITTED this 22nd day of July, 1980. 
VLAHOS,_.P_.ERKINS & SHARP 
~-
·--·--·~--~ 
, . -~~~~~he-Firm----
A t t orneys for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Utah 
A F F I D A V l T 
) 
) SS. 
) 
CAROL PETERSEN, being first duly sworn upon her oath. 
deposes and says: 
1. That she is the wife of Chris L. Petersen. 
2. Chris L. Petersen was not the owner, operator or 
licensee of a business knwon as Chris's, sometimes known as 
Chris's Saloon, sometimes known as Rocky P. Trading Post, 
which is located in Huntsville, Utah for the year 1976. 
3. That in August, 1976, your affiant, Carol 
Petersen, was the owner and 1 icensee of the premises here-
inabove described, and attached to this Affidavit, a photo-
copy of Certificate of License, showing that she was the 
1 icensee for a Class "B" Beer License, which 1 icense 
authorizes the sale of bottle beer only, which is the sub-
ject matter of the lawsuit, and which is attached to this 
Affidavit and by reference incorporated and made a part 
hereof. 
4. That Chris's is divided into two (2) areas, a 
front which was leased, operated and licensed to Carol 
Petersen, and a back portion which was leased out and which 
had a separate license to one Robert Stack, and attached to 
this Affidavit, is the License showing that he was a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
separate licensee and was the sole owner, operator and 
lessee of the premises located in the back and designated as 
Chris's Saloon. 
5. This Affidavit is given by your affiant herein in 
support of Chris L. Petersen's claim that he was not a 
proper party to the lawsuit instituted in the above-entitled 
matter by George Kevin Yost. 
DATED this ~~j- day of~~:;[:_~~~, 1980. 
~~~~~~~--f'iffirnt~~~~~_:__:_~··~·· 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be fore me this 5il'_/_._ day of 
July, 1980. 
My Commission Expires: 
7/16/83 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of July, 1980, I 
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Brief of Appellant by placing same in the United States 
~ail, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Richard Richards 
Attorney at Law 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(Attorney for Plaintiff) 
And 
Mr. Joseph C. McCarthy · 
Attorney at Law 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(Attorney for the State of Utah) 
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